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INTRODUCTION 
Rape is the most severe sexual offense, involving one of the most 
feared and reviled acts a person can inflict on another.  But what are 
the normative foundations of rape?  Initially, the doctrine of rape was 
limited to penial-vaginal forceful penetration.1  Over time, other 
forceful kinds of penetrations have been added: oral, anal, and later, 
the forceful insertion of inanimate objects.2  The requirement of 
using force lost its exclusiveness and much of its normative power, 
paving the way to other kinds of rape: sex by non-forceful coercion, 
sex by sedation, sex with mentally incompetent people, sex by fraud, 
and other forms of non-consensual problematic sex.3  The normative 
debate about each form is ongoing and, in a manner of speaking, rape 
has become a limitless notion.4  Where will the rape offense go next?  
Cyberspace, apparently.5 
The Israeli Supreme Court has recently affirmed convictions of 
rape by distant communication.6  The perpetrators conversed with 
children, teenagers, and adult women online, using fraud and 
blackmail to manipulate them into self-penetration.7 This 
groundbreaking judicial development is the inspiration behind the 
normative analysis offered in this Article, revolving around Western 
notions of rape.8  Should such ill-intended communications constitute 
rape?  Is the word “rape” suitable to describe virtual scenarios and 
 
  Ph.D., Haifa University; Senior Lecturer, Zefat Academic College; teaching and 
researching criminal law and cybercrime for twelve years; formerly a prosecutor and a 
defender.  I wish to thank my research assistant Liat Marks for her help, my friend 
Yehuda Levi for his editorial notes, and the editors for their thorough notes on the 
road to improve this Article. 
1.  Joanne Conaghan, The Essence of Rape, 39 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 153 (2019).  
The traditional legal terminology used was “carnal knowledge,” which is defined as 
the entry of the male sexual organ into the female sexual organ.  See 3 CHARLES E. 
TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 278 (15th ed. 2020). 
2.  See Conaghan, supra note 1, at 154; see CAROL E. TRACY ET AL., RAPE AND SEXUAL 
ASSAULT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (2012), http://www.womenslawproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Rape-and-Sexual-Assault-in-the-Legal-System-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RZ5G-2FZ7]. 
3.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-304(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2021 
Reg. Sess. General Assem.) (showing addition of non-forceful means of rape in 
Maryland’s rape statute). 
4.  See Conaghan, supra note 1, at 155 (illustrating both sides of the debate surrounding 
the expansion of the definition of rape). 
5.  See infra Section II.B. 
6.  See infra notes 76–105 and accompanying text. 
7.  See infra notes 76–105 and accompanying text. 
8.  See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text. 
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online communications involving sexual exploitation?  Although it is 
tempting to intuitively say no, the normative road to the proper legal 
answer is more complicated than it may seem.9 
This Article systematically scrutinizes the normative cyber rape 
thesis on Anglo-American doctrines of rape.10  It analytically divides 
the normative conception of rape into three facets and examines each 
separately: the physics of the offensive scenario;11 the settings of the 
physical scenario and the manner in which sexual autonomy is 
violated;12 and finally, the matter of proper criminal labeling.13  This 
Article shows that sexual autonomy is under substantial attack in 
cyberspace and that connecting this attack to different doctrines of 
rape is not such a farfetched notion.14  Nevertheless, a systematic 
analysis reveals normative gaps between offline and online 
harmfulness and wrongfulness,15 as well as normative gaps between 
different doctrines of rape.16  All in all, the framework of rape is 
unsuitable to handle these cyber-attacks.17  This does not suggest we 
should tolerate offensive online conduct, but rather that new and 
specific prohibitions are better suited to protect sexual autonomy 
online.18 
This Article will proceed as follows.  Part I reviews the offense of 
rape.19  It first describes the historical central developments and 
expansions of the offense, discussing various prominent legal 
constructs of rape.20  It then explores the Israeli precedent applying 
the rape offense to technological means.21 
 
9.  See infra Section II.G (describing the reasoning behind labeling instances of virtual 
communications as “rape”). 
10.  See infra Part II. 
11.  See infra Section II.B. 
12.  See infra Sections II.C–.F. 
13.  See infra Section II.G. 
14.  See infra Sections II.D–.F (showing how the doctrines of coercion, deception, and 
incompetence apply in a cyber context). 
15.  See infra notes 296–305 and accompanying text. 
16.  See infra notes 296–305 and accompanying text. 
17.  See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information 
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 586 (1998) (listing three 
reasons it is difficult for existing legal frameworks to apply to changing technologies). 
18.  See infra text accompanying notes 275–76, 285–301, 323–33.  See generally infra 
Sections II.C–.G. 
19.  See infra Part I. 
20.  See infra Section I.A. 
21.  See infra Section I.B. 
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Part II extensively analyzes the cyber rape thesis within the 
framework of Anglo-American doctrines of rape.22  After reviewing 
the rapidly growing technological developments in communication in 
the age of cyberspace, it normatively scrutinizes the thesis by 
analytically dividing the normative notion of rape into three facets 
and examining each separately.23 
Eventually this Article concludes that sexual autonomy is indeed 
under attack in cyberspace by use of other forms of technology and 
communication, and that there are significant normative similarities 
in the ways sexual autonomy is attacked offline and online.24  
However, applying the framework of rape to this technology seems 
disproportional, unfair, and distorts public messages about the 
harmfulness and dangerousness of the perpetrators who commit this 
offense.  Cyber sexual offensiveness should not be tolerated, but new 
legal frameworks are more suitable to address it.25 
I.  REVIEWING THE LAW OF RAPE 
A.  History, Rationales, and Legal Constructs 
While much of humanity has changed for the better, some of its 
shameful facets seem constant.  The act of rape has always been a 
part of human conduct around the globe.26  The criminalization of 
rape is also far from new.27  Old regimes criminalized rape to protect 
the honor of women’s’ fathers, husbands, and brothers;28 thus, it 
 
22.  See infra Section II.A. 
23.  See infra Sections II.B–.G. 
24.  See infra Conclusion. 
25.  See infra text accompanying notes 311–33. 
26.  See Megan Lutz-Priefert, Note, A Call for a More Permanent International Definition 
of Rape, 6 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 85, 86 (2015) (reviewing the 
omnipresence of rape throughout time, culture, gender, and race); see Katharine K. 
Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 221, 225–27 
(2015); see Elizabeth Hanus, Comment, Rape by Nonphysical Coercion: State v. 
Brooks, 64 UNIV. KAN. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2016); see also Alena Allen, Rape 
Messaging, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2018) (noting that rape has existed 
since the earliest civilizations). 
27.  Hanus, supra note 26, at 1143; Allen, supra note 26, at 1034. 
28.  See Ben A. McJunkin, Deconstructing Rape by Fraud, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 
36–38 (2014); see Margo Kaplan, Rape Beyond Crime, 66 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1055 
(2017); see Kari Hong, A New Mens Rea for Rape: More Convictions and Less 
Punishment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 259, 274 (2018); see Michael Mullen, Note, Rape 
by Fraud: Eluding Washington Rape Statutes, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1035, 1046 
(2018); see also  STUART P. GREEN, CRIMINALIZING SEX: A UNIFIED LIBERAL THEORY 
57 (2020) (describing the ancient justification of the offense). 
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follows the rape offense overlooked marital coercion.29  
Unfortunately, in modern times, the rape phenomenon is still far from 
being obsolete or even uncommon.30 
While sexual offensiveness appears to be an ill-fated constant in 
human life, the offense of rape has undergone major changes 
throughout the years.31  The general paradigm of rape, revolving 
around coercive sex, has clearly expanded throughout the years.32 
At the end of the nineteenth century, American rape law leaned on 
the paradigm of the stranger rapist, lurking in the shadows, prepared 
to attack virtuous women.33  Enforcement focused on African-
American males while knowingly overlooking white male 
perpetrators.34  The law required victims to fight to their death.35  
Sexist norms were woven into the rape law, which in turn enforced 
those norms.36  Late in the twentieth century, women’s rights 
movements succeeded in achieving major reforms in rape law, 
perceiving rape as a crime of violence and control.37  The physical 
element of rape as a legal construct has expanded.38  The FBI 
formerly defined rape as “the carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly 
 
29.  See Melanie Randall & Vasanthi Venkatesh, The Right to No: The Crime of Marital 
Rape, Women’s Human Rights, and International Law, 41 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 153, 
154–55 (2015); see Stacy-Ann Elvy, A Postcolonial Theory of Spousal Rape: The 
Caribbean and Beyond, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 89, 92 (2015); see also Patricia J. 
Falk, Husbands Who Drug and Rape Their Wives: The Injustice of the Marital 
Exemption in Ohio’s Sexual Offenses, 36 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 265, 275–76 (2015) 
(analyzing marital rape in modern times). 
30.  See Lutz-Priefert, supra note 26, at 86–87 (discussing rape statistics) . 
31.  McJunkin, supra note 28, at 6–7; Graceann Carimico et al., Rape and Sexual Assualt, 
17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 359, 360 (2016); Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law 
Gatekeeping, 58 B.C. L. REV. 206, 211–13 (2017); Leslie Berkseth et al., Review 
Article, Rape and Sexual Assault, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 743, 747 (2017) (noting 
that state legislatures have thoroughly changed the substantive criminal laws 
regarding rape during previous decades). 
32.  Hanus, supra note 26, at 1143–44. 
33.  Allen, supra note 26, at 1052–53; Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 29, at 158. 
34.  See Yung, supra note 31, at 229–30. 
35.  See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986). 
36.  See id. at 1093, 1095. 
37.  See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO 
SAY NO 4 (1987) (methodically criticizing former laws of rape and suggesting 
application of rape law for each instance of non-consent); see Estrich, supra note 35, 
at 1087, 1095, 1121–22, 1127, 1132. 
38.  An Updated Definition of Rape, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.justi 
ce.gov/archives/opa/blog/updated-definition-rape [https://perma.cc/D2EZ-M7H5]. 
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and against her will[,]” meaning sexual intercourse.39  Today we see 
a broader definition by the FBI and DOJ: “penetration, no matter how 
slight, of the vagina or anus with body part or object, or oral 
penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of 
the victim.”40  
This change is not only about expanding the offense beyond the 
traditional intercourse, but also about perceiving males as potential 
victims.41  Rape was previously a gender-specific crime—only men 
were the perpetrators, and only women their victims.42  As the crime 
started including male victims, that also changed by expanding the 
physiological concept of rape.43  Evidently, coercion does not 
necessarily have to rely on force.44  While many states still include 
this element, there is a wide academic consensus that doing so is 
normatively obsolete.45  
The modern conception of rape connects the offense with the need 
to protect the sexual autonomy of any gender.46  Personal autonomy 
 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
41.  See id. 
42.  See JENNIFER TEMKIN, RAPE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 55–56, 67 (2nd ed. 2002) 
(writing that until 1994 rape was the most prominent gender-based offense).  But see 
Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 345 (Isr.) (defining rape victims as only women under 
Israeli law). 
43.  TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 68–69. 
44.  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335, 336–37 
(2017). 
45.  Hanus, supra note 26, at 1146–48; Hong, supra note 28, at 274–79 (noting that most 
U.S. states still require force as an element of rape; arguing to discard force as a vital 
element); see Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 342–43, 347 (suggesting a change in the 
meaning of force to include all types of coercion). 
46.  See Stuart P. Green, Lies, Rape, and Statutory Rape, in LAW AND LIES: DECEPTION 
AND TRUTH-TELLING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 194, 206 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2015); see Hanus, supra note 26, at 1144; see also McJunkin, supra note 28, at 7 
(noting that the modern normative basis of the rape offense is widely understood as a 
violation of sexual autonomy).  But see Luis E. Chiesa, Solving the Riddle of Rape-by-
Deception, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 407, 429–30 (2017) (suggesting that the law of 
rape is meant to protect freedom, rather than autonomy); Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 436 (2016) (claiming rape is a crime 
of gender inequality); McJunkin, supra note 28, at 43–46 (calling for 
acknowledgement of human dignity as the normative basis of the rape offense); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 
YALE L.J. 1372, 1378–80 (2013) (arguing this rationale is incoherent due to the lack 
of substantive criminalization of sex by fraud).  See generally Joseph J. Fischel & 
Hilary R. O’Connell, Disabling Consent, or Reconstructing Sexual Autonomy, 30 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 428 (2015) (dismissing criticism and supporting sexual 
autonomy as the rationale of sex crimes). 
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is about the ability to control, choose, and decide one’s lifestyle.47  It 
is about self-governance and the capacity to reflect and revise one’s 
identity and values.48  All of the above may be considered necessary 
to personhood.49  Personal autonomy is extremely valued in modern 
times.50 
Personal autonomy can be broken down into specific layers, one of 
which regards sex.51 Sexual autonomy can be perceived broadly to 
include the right to choose sexual activities, sexual partners, places, 
timing, and additional circumstances.52  Various actions may 
implicate positive and negative dimensions of sexual autonomy.53 
Alongside the paradigm of coercive rape, there are other 
paradigms, unique in the sense they do not exclude scenarios in 
which victims consent to intercourse, treating that consent as legally 
defective.54  One of them is quite common in American 
jurisdictions.55  Having sex with minors is forbidden even with their 
consent, sometimes between two consenting minors, which is known 
 
47.  See 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 28, 
115 (1986) ; see Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim’s State of Mind, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 759, 765 (2000) (explaining the notion of personal autonomy); see Joel 
Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 446–47, 453–54 (1983). 
48.  See Chiesa, supra note 46, at 420 (stating there is no universal definition of 
autonomy, but the central understanding is that autonomy is about capability of “self-
rule”). 
49.  See McJunkin, supra note 28, at 8 (connecting autonomy with personhood, which is 
required for flourishing). 
50 . Daniel Susser et al., Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 35 (2019) (stressing that autonomy lies at the normative core of 
liberal democracies). 
51.  See Green, supra note 46, at 206–08 (comparing personal autonomy to property law, 
in the sense that personal autonomy is made of a bundle of rights). 
52.  See id. at 208 (illustrating sexual autonomy). 
53.  Id. at 207; Hanus, supra note 26, at 1144 (stressing that sexual autonomy has a 
negative dimension—freedom from unwanted sex—and a positive dimension—
freedom to pursue sexual relationships that are mutually desired); see Chiesa, supra 
note 46, at 421, 432–33 (distinguishing “autonomy,” the capacity for self-
determination in accordance with one’s authentic or true values, from freedom, which 
is the ability to act without significant external constraints). 
54.  See infra text accompanying notes 55–62. 
55.  See Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer, #MeToo, Statutory Rape Laws, and the Persistence of 
Gender Stereotypes, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 117, 119 (“All states and the federal 
government have enacted a collection of crimes aimed at punishing sex between two 
persons when at least one is under the age of consent.”). 
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as “statutory rape.”56  This niche reflects the concept of the 
incompetent victim.57 
The second paradigm, while being wide in theory, is relatively 
narrow in practice.  It is comprised of situations in which the victim 
agreed to an act without comprehending it as sexual, or agreed to 
have intercourse with the perpetrator who had disguised himself as 
the victim’s spouse—i.e., “rape by fraud.”58  This niche reflects the 
uninformed victim. 
There are also other forms of rape.  Rape by sedation is typically 
devoid of any consent by the victim.59  Self-intoxication is more 
complex, at least in cases in which a person can still speak and move; 
one might suggest intoxication does not allow meaningful consent, 
but nevertheless, some consent is possible.60  However, sedation is 
not relevant in cyber contexts, for the time being, and there is no 
technology to sedate another online user from afar.61  On the other 
hand, coercion, incompetence, and fraud are all present online,62 and 
their rape doctrines may be adapted for the electronic world.  In one 
country, that has already happened.63 
 
56.  See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 387, 404 (1984); see Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: 
Statutory Rape, Meaningful Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence 
Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205, 1226, 1240 (1998); see Daryl J. Olszewski, 
Comment, Statutory Rape in Wisconsin: History, Rationale, and the Need for Reform, 
89 MARQ. L. REV. 693, 693–94 (2006); see Anna High, Good, Bad and Wrongful 
Juvenile Sex: Rethinking the Use of Statutory Rape Laws Against the Protected Class, 
69 ARK. L. REV. 787, 791–836 (2016); see also Asaf Harduf, Statutory (Is Not) Rape: 
Reshaping the Criminalization of Underage Sex, and Beyond, 56 CRIM. L. BULL. 871, 
871 (2020) (reviewing and criticizing laws of statutory rape). 
57.  See Harduf, supra note 56, at 901. 
58.  See Rubenfeld, supra note 46, at 1395–1402 (discussing laws regarding rape by 
fraud). 
59.  See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (2002) (discussing cases of drug rape; reviewing 
American legislation and calling for a legal reform). 
60.  See Hong, supra note 28, at 289–90 (claiming that intoxicated people lack the ability 
to meaningfully distinguish wanted sex from unwanted sex, and that the crime of rape 
by intoxication is underinclusive). 
61.  See generally Nora Fitzgerald & K. Jack Riley, Drug-Facilitated Rape: Looking for 
the Missing Pieces, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Apr. 2000, at 8, 13 (“Drug-facilitated rape 
may be initiated in social settings, like parties and clubs, not traditionally considered 
high-risk environments.”). 
62.  See infra Sections II.D–.F. 
63.  See infra text accompanying notes 64–112. 
  
2021] Cyber Rape: Online Violations of Sexual Autonomy  365 
 
B.  Rape Meets Technology: The Israeli Precedent 
The general expansions of the rape offense and its legal 
construct—e.g., the direct use of force to overpower the will of 
another, other ways of coercion, and the inclusion of underage and 
fraudulent sex—have brought an astonishing judicial expansion to 
the concept of rape in Israel: “rape by communication.”64 
Prior to the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel 
in 1948—a few years after the Holocaust—Britain had governed 
Palestine for many years and established a local common law system 
without juries.65  The Penal Code in Israel was similar to codes the 
British used for other colonies and territories.66  At the birth of its 
independent legal framework, Israel adopted most mandatory laws 
enacted by the British.67  While the Israeli legal system is based in 
common law, it also includes aspects of civil law.68  Throughout its 
first decades, the Israeli judicial system was significantly influenced 
by British law and looked at British precedents to resolve legal 
debates.69  In time, the Israeli courts gained confidence and no longer 
needed to rely on foreign rulings to resolve cases.70  However, many 
of the laws set by the British sovereignty are still in effect even 
today,71 as are a few of the Ottoman regime laws which preceded the 
British rule.72 
Israel’s rape offense is defined in section 345 of its Penal Code, 
1977, and includes five equal alternative forms of non-aggravated 
rape: (1) intercourse with a woman without her freely given consent; 
 
64.  See infra text accompanying notes 73–112. 
65.  Steven J. Colby, Note, A Jury for Israel?: Determining When a Lay Jury System Is 
Ideal in a Heterogeneous Country, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 121, 126–27 (2014). 
66.  See Shlomo Guberman, Development of the Law in Israel- The First 50 Years, ISR. 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. (June 19, 2000), https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/israel 
at50/pages/development%20of%20the%20law%20in%20israel-%20the%20first%205 
/0%20yea.aspx [https://perma.cc/WH96-N8SL]. 
67.  See id. 
68.  See id. 
69.  See id. 
70.  See id. 
71.  See Ron Harris & Michael Crystal, Some Reflections on the Transplantation of British 
Company Law in Post-Ottoman Palestine, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 561, 564–68, 
582–87 (2009). 
72.  See, e.g., George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 493–94 (1994); Natalie Orpett, The Archaeology 
of Land Law: Excavating Law in the West Bank, 40 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 344, 389 
(2012). 
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(2) intercourse with a woman with her consent, obtained by deceit 
with respect to the identity of the person or the nature of the act; (3) 
intercourse with a woman below the age of fourteen, even with her 
consent; (4) intercourse with a woman by exploiting her state of 
unconsciousness or other condition that prevents her from giving her 
free consent; and (5) intercourse with a woman by exploiting the fact 
that she is mentally ill or deficient.73  Intercourse is defined as 
“introduc[ing] any part of the body or any object into the woman’s 
sex organ.”74  Following the gender-specific history of the offense, 
rape is still only defined as an offense against women under Israeli 
law.75 
At the end of 2011, for the first time in Israel and perhaps in human 
history, the prosecution indicted a person for “facilitating rape” in 
what can be defined as “verbal rape” or “communicative rape.”76  A 
sixty-nine-year-old male was accused of causing rape, after he had 
phoned a minor, presented himself as a physician and instructed her 
to penetrate herself.77  That same week, the prosecution indicted a 
fifty-year-old man for rape, after posing online as a teenage boy, 
causing a minor to penetrate herself.78  Eventually the charges were 
dropped, and the defendant pled guilty to aggravated indecent acts.79 
To date, the new intriguing paradigm of communicative rape has 
received critical judicial attention only in two short decisions.  In 
2012, an IDF twenty-nine-year-old male soldier was indicted for 
maliciously causing rape.80  He falsely presented online as a 
 
73.  Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 345(a) (Isr.). 
74.  § 345(c). 
75.  Id.; see also TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 55–56, 67–69 (noting that, until 1994, rape 
was the most prominent gender-based offense, as it was only considered penile 
penetration of a vagina). 
76.  See CrimA 34264-12-11 Israel vs. Melamed (Dec. 18, 2011) (Isr.) (on file with 
author).  It appears that the prosecution and the defense reached an agreement; besides 
the indictment, there is no trace of this case.  See id.  The remainder of Section I.B. 
discusses several Israeli criminal cases that signify the early recognition of cyber rape 
as a punishable offense.  The following Israeli judicial opinions and court filings are 
published and readily available solely in Hebrew.  All referenced authorities are on 
file with the Author, and his interpretation and analysis are contained in the 
subsequent discussion.  
77.  Id. 
78.  See Case (DC CT) 40230-12-11 State of Israel v. Sabach (Dec. 21, 2011) (Isr.) (on 
file with author). 
79.  See CrimA 538/13 Sabach v. State of Israel (Dec. 26, 2013) (Isr.) (on file with 
author). 
80.  Case (DC Hi) 1520/12 State of Israel v. Danino (May 7, 2012) (Isr.) (on file with 
author).  
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nineteen-year-old female soldier, pushing teenage girls to penetrate 
themselves, sometimes by blackmail.81  At the bail hearing, the 
District Judge briefly endorsed the possibility of a new legal 
paradigm of rape, but nonetheless suggested it seemed somewhat 
disproportionate regarding the level of punishment for such actions.82  
The prosecution took the hint and later dropped the rape charges; the 
defendant pled guilty to aggravated indecent acts and was sentenced 
to two years imprisonment.83  
The last time this paradigm received any critical judicial attention 
was in 2015.84  At a preliminary hearing, the district court briefly 
denied the defense claim that such actions do not constitute rape, 
stressing the necessity of protecting minors online.85  This case also 
ended in a plea bargain, replacing the rape offense with aggravated 
indecent acts.86 
At this point, one might get the impression that the verbal rape 
paradigm was but a prosecutorial tool, pushing defendants into 
pleading guilty to lesser charges.  On the other hand, some 
defendants have also pled guilty to charges of causing rape, asking 
the court for leniency.87 One of these defendants, charged with 
causing rape, sodomy, and indecent acts against thirty-three minors, 
was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment.88  In 2015, at the 
sentencing appeal, the Israeli Supreme Court stressed the severity of 
the acts but nevertheless granted the appeal and reduced the sentence 
to twelve years.89  It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Israel 
did not address the new rape paradigm at all in this specific case.90  
In 2016, two defendants pled guilty at the district court and were 
therefore convicted in multiple cases of “facilitating rape” against 
 
81.  Id. 
82.  See id.  The defendant made bail.  Id. 
83.  See CrimA 2656/13 Doe v. State of Israel (Jan. 21, 2014) (Isr.) (on file with author).  
The Supreme Court of Israel denied the defendant’s appeal.  See id. 
84.  See Case (DC TA) 41309-12-14 State of Israel v. Morovati (Mar. 16, 2015) (Isr.) (on 
file with author). 
85.  Id. 
86.  See Case (DC TA) 41309-12-14 State of Israel vs. Morovati (July 8, 2015) (Isr.) (on 
file with author).  The defendant was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment.  
Id. 
87.  See CrimA 707/14 Doe v. State of Israel (July 6, 2015) (Isr.) (on file with author). 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  See id. 
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minors.91  Later that year, another defendant pled guilty to facilitating 
rape by blackmailing a young adult.92  This was the first application 
of the new rape paradigm related to an adult victim—i.e., a young 
female soldier.93  At the sentencing appeal, once again the Supreme 
Court raised no questions whatsoever regarding the new 
groundbreaking rape paradigm.94  It only emphasized the severity of 
abusing a young person and added a sentence of five years 
imprisonment instead of 3.5 at the end of 2018.95  The Supreme 
Court denied the defendant’s appeal against his 4.5 year sentence.96  
Judge Alex Stein emphasized the severity of the actions without 
addressing the pioneering prosecutorial thesis.97 
Thus far, the last appearance of the innovative paradigm of 
facilitating rape against minors at the Supreme Court of Israel was in 
March 2020, when, once again an online child abuser was charged 
with causing rape, indecent acts, threats and more.98  In the District 
Court, the defendant moved for dismissal, claiming that the legality 
principle99 denies the possibility of charging him with offenses of 
rape and indecent acts from a distance.100  The District Court denied 
the claim, but allowed the defendant to make an elaborate plea at the 
end of the case.101  According to the agreed upon plea bargain, the 
rape indictment was dismissed and the defendant admitted to the 
other offenses before being sentenced to three years of 
imprisonment.102  In his appeal, the defendant claimed, once again, 
that when performed from a distance, there can be no conviction for 
rape and indecent act offenses.103  The Supreme Court maintained 
that the defendant’s claims have no legal basis, as there is no 
importance to the distinction between physical indecent acts and 
 
91.  Case (DC Hi) 9232-07-15 State of Israel v. Timsut (Mar. 28, 2016) (Isr.) (on file with 
author); Case (DC CT) 34838-04-15 State of Israel v. Gavrilov (Apr. 11, 2016) (Isr.) 
(on file with author). 
92.  CrimA 8720/15 State of Israel v. Pinto (Sept. 11, 2016) (Isr.) (on file with author). 
93.  See id. 
94.  See CrimA 3792/18 Doe vs. State of Israel (Nov. 11, 2018) (Isr.) (on file with author). 
95.  See id. 
96.  Id. 
97.  See id. 
98.  See CrimA 1195/19 Doe vs. State of Israel (Mar. 3, 2020) (Isr.) (on file with author). 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
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online ones.104  Since the Supreme Court did not directly address the 
verbal rape thesis, it is clear, once again, that this thesis does not 
provoke judicial criticism.105 
So, although it was never critically affirmed in a formal verdict by 
any court in Israel,106 verbal rape seems to be a legal reality in 
Israel.107  It is doubtful that future verdicts will nullify the thesis, 
since a few people have already been convicted and sentenced based 
on it.108  Whether this legal reality is worthy or not is an entirely 
different question. 
This Article will not review the Israeli history of rape law and how 
the legal provisions defining rape have developed, sometimes by 
bizarre accidents, allowing the creative prosecution to give rise to a 
new form of a rape offense.109  The central question is not doctrinal, 
but normative.  This Article inquires whether or not the rape offense 
should cover such scenarios.  When a person is brought by ill-
intended communication to sexually touch or penetrate themself 
while the perpetrator is far away, should the legal notion of rape 
apply?  Can words generate rape from afar? 
The Israeli example proves that this expansion is more than an 
academic exercise.110  Although this groundbreaking development is 
the inspiration for this Article, by no means will this Article examine 
the legal doctrines of rape in Israel and assess their applicability to 
online scenarios.  The following analysis will revolve around Anglo-
American notions and constructs of rape and examine if there is a 
normative basis to take these notions further—i.e., into the cyber 
world.111  Such an intricate question requires analysis of rape law, its 
purpose and boundaries, as well as the implied interaction between 
law and technology.112 
 
104.  Id. 
105.  See id. 
106.  See id. 
107.  See supra notes 76–105 and accompanying text. 
108.  See supra notes 87–105 and accompanying text. 
109.  See supra notes 76–105 and accompanying text. 
110.  See supra notes 76–105 and accompanying text. 
111.  See discussion infra Section II.C. 
112.  See infra Sections II.C–.G. 
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II.  SEXUAL OFFENSIVENESS GOES CYBER 
A.  Communication in the Age of Cyberspace 
The ability to send someone a message from afar is nothing new.  
For millennia, human and animal messengers have delivered 
messages in this manner.113  As technology and economies evolved, 
sending messages became easier and cheaper.114  People learned to 
read and write and the printed word revolutionized the world of 
communication.115  Professional post offices were born, and every 
person could send a letter, even to the far side of the globe.116  The 
telegraph opened the door for instantaneous communication.117  Later 
the telephone enabled people to hear the voice of others from a 
distance in real time.118  A person could now talk to friends, foes, 
rivals or strangers directly; the communication could contain any 
content, including harmful or even criminal content.119  Then came 
cyberspace. 
Cyberspace offers people numerous rich and innovative 
possibilities and courses of action, including diverse ways of 
communication.120  While every new communication technology has 
brought its own advancements, as well as challenges, some suggest 
that cyberspace is especially advanced and challenging.121  What post 
offices and the telephone made cheap, cyberspace quickly made free: 
 
113.  E.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 76 (1983) (noting the Persian 
and Roman Empires’ use of couriers on horseback). 
114.  See, e.g., id. at 98–100. 
115.  See, e.g., Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 74–76, 95–
96 (2016) (explaining the impact of the printing press and the evolution of literacy in 
the United States). 
116.  See, e.g., POOL, supra note 113, at 79. 
117.  See West, supra note 115, at 96. 
118.  See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL 
STUD. 155, 158 (1997). 
119.  See, e.g., id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (stating the petitioner 
was convicted of transmitting wagering information by phone from Los Angeles to 
Miami and Boston). 
120.  See Perritt, Jr., supra note 118, at 160–64. 
121.  See POOL, supra note 113, at 91–96 (recounting the challenges of fitting evolving 
telegraphic communications into legal frameworks); see Perritt Jr., supra note 118, at 
162–63 (discussing how the internet challenges traditional sovereign state boundaries 
and shapes legal institutions); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet Is Changing 
the Public International Legal System, 88 KY. L.J. 885, 886–87 (2000) (describing 
challenges set by older communication technologies and claiming that the challenges 
set by cyberspace are unique). 
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people with online access can reach anyone, publish content, and 
hear anyone else’s voice from around the globe.122  
Regardless of the critical economic aspect, cyberspace introduced 
many innovations to the world of communication.123  One is the 
combination of voice and picture: the live video feed, a technology 
which was once considered science fiction, is now a common banal 
reality.124  This revolutionary technology opened many new 
possibilities, including sexual ones,125 making it easier to locate 
others with similar sexual taste.126  For example, one can see the 
sexual acts of others in real time.127  When the two are consenting 
adults, that is usually not considered a legal problem, or at least not a 
sex offense.128  In other situations, it can become offensive and 
abusive.129 
 
122.  See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1807, 
1815, 1821, 1831, 1837 (1995) (foreseeing how the availability of speech possibilities 
would change the world). 
123.  See Amitai Etzioni, Implications of Select New Technologies for Individual Rights 
and Public Safety, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 261 (2002) (describing the shift from 
old communication methods to cyberspace). 
124.  See Tiffany N. Beaty, Comment, Navigating the Safe Harbor Rule: The Need for a 
DMCA Compass, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 207, 208 (2009). 
125.  See Edward Castronova, Fertility and Virtual Reality, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1085, 
1092–93 (2009) (detailing how technology enables sexual options); see Robert 
Bloomfield & Benjamin Duranske, Protecting Children in Virtual Worlds Without 
Undermining Their Economic, Educational, and Social Benefits, 66 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1175, 1185–86 (2009); see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual 
Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1076–77, 1082–83 (2018); 
see Lillian Esposito, Note, Sexual Ageplay in Virtual Reality: Practicing Free Speech 
or Producing Child Pornography?, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1913, 1921–24 (2019); see 
also Yusef Al-Jarani, All Fun and (Mind) Games? Protecting Consumers from the 
Manipulative Harms of Interactive Virtual Reality, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
299, 350 (2019) (describing possibly harmful new capabilities of sex via virtual 
reality). 
126.  GREEN, supra note 28, at 45 (noting that the internet enables sexual possibilities for 
people with idiosyncratic sexual tastes and interests). 
127.  E.g., Matthew Green, Comment, Sex on the Internet: A Legal Click or an Illicit 
Trick?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 527, 530 (2002). 
128.  See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711–12 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming 
conviction of disseminating obscenity online); see also John F. McGuire, Note, When 
Speech is Heard Around the World: Internet Content Regulation in the United States 
and Germany, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 759–60 (1999) (discussing the Thomas case 
and other criminal aspects of disseminating obscenity and pornography online). 
129.  E.g., Melissa Farley et al., Online Prostitution and Trafficking, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1039, 
1079–80 (2014). 
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A second related innovation is smart phones.130  Communication 
devices were historically stationary, usable only in designated 
places.131  The combination of smart phones and cyberspace has 
made it possible to use one’s communication device almost anywhere 
one goes.132  Smart phones are much more than just “phones.”133  
One can use them for video chats, as they are also video cameras.  
Smart phones can also take numerous high-quality photos and store 
them for free.134  Thirty years ago, video cameras were very 
expensive, large, and heavy, ensuring that videos were neither 
spontaneous nor very secretive.135  Nowadays, filming a video is just 
another smartphone application.136  A few decades ago, one needed a 
camera to take about thirty pictures, and each photo cost money to 
send to a third-party for developing, all before knowing how they 
would turn out.137  Nowadays, one can take infinite high-resolution 
photos for free, observe them immediately, and later post them or 
send them to someone without the involvement of others.138  Such 
photographs may be related to sex, as one can take pictures of their 
naked body and send them to current or potential partners.139 
Again, this is not considered a problem for consenting adults.  
Technology is typically neither evil nor benevolent; it only provides 
new possibilities for people to act upon.140  Some of them are 
 
130.  Hayley S. Strong, Casenote, “Sexting” to Minors in a Rapidly Evolving Digital Age: 
Frix v. State Establishes the Applicability of Georgia’s Obscenity Statutes to Text 
Messages, 61 MERCER L. REV 1283, 1283 (2009). 
131.  Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of the Virtual Worlds Govern 
Everyday Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 58 (2012). 
132.  Id. 
133.  Strong, supra note 130, at 1283. 
134.  E.g., Fairfield, supra note 131, at 61–62. 
135.  See Steven Siegel, Note, The Video Revolution and the First Amendment: 
Democratization of Media Production and Public Access to the Future “Electronic 
Public Forum”, 8 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 257, 260 (1990). 
136.  See C. Scott Brown, Smartphone Stills Are Getting so Much Better, but What About 
Video?, ANDROID AUTH. (March 23, 2019), https://www.androidauthority.com/smart 
phone-video-features-964546/ [https://perma.cc/Y7AW-LPRY]. 
137.  See Siegel, supra note 135, at 260. 
138.  See supra notes 133–34, 136 and accompanying text. 
139.  See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1897–98 (2019) 
(acknowledging the ability to share our naked bodies online). 
140.  See Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1156 (2000) 
(describing technology as the manipulation of the physical, biological, and logical 
world); see also Arthur J. Cockfield, What is Legal Knowledge?: Towards a Law and 
Technology Theory, 30 MAN. L.J. 383, 386 (2004) (stressing the dual nature of 
technology). 
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criminal as cyberspace paves numerous criminal roads,141 some of 
them are virtual versions of old crimes, and some are innovative.142 
A third innovation of cyberspace is the rich possibility of 
conversing with strangers.143  Cyberspace is often a world of fantasy 
and lies.144  Impersonating another in real life can be hard and 
dangerous.  On the other hand, going online, creating fictitious 
profiles, and talking to strangers is both easy and relatively safe.145  
No one sees the user for who they are, which makes them 
uninhibited, for better or worse.146  One can find the courage to speak 
to someone attractive, speak the truth, advocate for values, and 
become the best version of themselves.147  But they can also turn to 
the darkest corners of the net and become the worst version of 
themselves.148 
Cyber communication is closely related to another innovative 
aspect of cyberspace, which is seemingly modest at first glance.149  
Next to richer forms of communication—e.g., voice chat and video 
 
141.  See Charlotte Decker, Note, Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument to Update the United 
States Criminal Code to Reflect the Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 959, 964 (2008) (noting every new technology provides criminal opportunities, 
but cyberspace provides endless opportunities). 
142.  See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 465, 471–72 (1997); see Michael Edmund O’Neill, Old Crimes in New 
Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 282 (2000); see Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1047–48, 
1071–72 (2001); see Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. 
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 213, 224–25 (2003); see also Susan W. Brenner, Toward a 
Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 50–
51, 65, 68–70 (2004) (analyzing if and how cybercrime differs from offline crime). 
143.  See AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 
TEENS, PRIVACY & SOCIAL NETWORKS: HOW TEENS MANAGE THEIR ONLINE 




144.  See Paris Martineau, Internet Deception is Here to StaySo What Do We Do Now?, 
WIRED (Dec. 30, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/internet-deception-
stay-what-do-now/ [https://perma.cc/63AW-VXZF]. 
145.  See Katyal, supra note 142, at 1047–48. 
146.  See Andrea Chester & Di Bretherton, Impression Management and Identity Online, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNET PSYCHOLOGY 223, 223–25 (Adam N. Joinson et 
al. eds., 2007) (noting that in cyberspace we can create new versions of ourselves, 
including versions impossible to create offline). 
147.  See id. at 223–24. 
148.  See id. at 224. 
149.  See infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
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chat—cyberspace, personal computers, and smart phones also offer 
the possibility to simultaneously converse in writing only, all in a 
fluent, easy, and accessible way.150  A written conversation may at 
times be more disguised and it might feel more impersonal, as no one 
hears the intonation of the other user’s voice.151  Psychologically, it 
might be easier to threaten someone by written words than by their 
own voice, to blackmail someone, and perhaps to violate their sexual 
autonomy.152  Distance weakens empathy and accountability, and 
requires less audaciousness.153 
Any person may use technology, mainly cyberspace or 
telecommunication, to bring another to sexually touch oneself.154  
Whenever it is done with a free, informed, and competent form of 
consent, it is seemingly none of our business.  However, if consent is 
defective, lacking freedom, information, or competency, should we 
call it “rape?” 
As discussed above, 155 this Article analyzes the concept of cyber 
rape by looking at the three facets of the notion of rape: the physics 
of the act;156  the settings of sexual interaction, with consideration of 
attacks on sexual autonomy and the ability to replicate these things 
online;157 and proper labeling of offensive sexual conduct in 
cyberspace. 158   
 
150.  See Shashank V. Joshi et al., The Use of Technology by Youth: Implications for 
Psychiatric Educators, 43 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 101, 101–02 (2019) (discussing various 
means of modern communication and usage rates for different age brackets). 
151.  See ADAM N. JOINSON, UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERNET BEHAVIOR: 
VIRTUAL WORLDS, REAL LIVES 25 (2003); see also John Suler, The Online 
Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCH. & BEHAV. 321, 322 (2004) (acknowledging the 
disinhibition effect online due to user’s feeling of anonymity). 
152.  See Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, Through the Internet Looking Glass: Expressing and 
Validating the True Self, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNET PSYCHOLOGY 205, 
212 (Adam N. Joinson et al. eds., 2007) (suggesting that online communication’s 
elimination of physical hints disinhibits the users). 
153.  See Katyal, supra note 142, at 1071. 
154.  E.g., Martie P. Thompson & Deidra J. Morrison, Prospective Predictors of 
Technology-Based Sexual Coercion by College Males, 3 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 233, 233–
35 (discussing study on the emerging threat of “technology-based coercive behaviors” 
and potential risk factors for predatory behavior). 
155.  See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
156.  See infra Section II.B. 
157.  See infra Section II.C. 
158.  See infra Section II.G. 
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B.  Cyber Rape: The Physics of Offline Rape Versus Communicative 
Rape 
As stated above, rape as a concept historically only included 
penial-vaginal penetration.159  Although that changed a while ago in 
many countries,160 in order to include more scenarios, rape still 
requires some sort of sexual penetration161 of only one of the three 
penetrable parts.162  Accordingly, non-penetrative sexual assaults are, 
per definition, not rape: no penetration, even a partial one,163 means 
no rape.164  What happens to these physics when technology enters 
the picture? 
On the one hand, penetration is still possible.  The offline rape 
typically includes penetration by the perpetrator and that act cannot 
be done from a distance yet.165  Nevertheless, bringing someone to 
self-penetration is clearly possible, even from the other side of the 
globe.166  Note the difference between penetration and masturbation: 
whereas male masturbation typically does not involve penetration, 
this act is excluded from the current notions of rape.167  Bringing 
 
159.  See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
160.  See Conaghan, supra note 1, at 171–72 (reviewing legislation in different countries 
with regards to the element of penetration or lack thereof, and its normative vitality). 
161.  See Allen, supra note 26, at 1062 (acknowledging the distinction between rape and 
battery, based on the rationale of sexual autonomy). 
162.  See Baker, supra note 26, at 227–28 (claiming that rape is unique regarding the 
emotional, relational, hedonic, and dignitary injuries resulting from particular parts of 
the body being touched or invaded and suggesting that this focus is related to 
physiological or cultural reasons). 
163.  See Lutz-Priefert, supra note 26, at 97–98 (discussing requirement of penetration and 
alternative definitions; supporting the FBI’s broad definition of penetration, including 
any amount of vaginal or anal penetration by a body part or object). 
164.  But see Alberto Cadoppi & Michael Vitiello, A Kiss Is Just a Kiss, or Is It? A 
Comparative Look at Italian and American Sex Crimes, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 
193 (2010) (reviewing broad Italian definition of rape—i.e., CODICE PENALE [C.P.] 
art. 609-bis (Italy)—that requires no penetration and looks for coercion of sexual 
acts); GREEN, supra note 28, at 64–65 (discussing broad conceptions of offenses 
equivalent to rape in Canada, which do not require penetration). 
165.  See Tyler Patrick Lovejoy, Comment, A New Playground: Sexual Predators and 
Pedophiles Online: Criminalizing Cyber Sex Between Adults and Minors, 20 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 311, 325–26 (2008) (stating that a sexually explicit conversation can 
rise to the level of sexual conduct and be communicated over the phone without 
penetration). 
166.  See id. at 325–27. 
167.  See Robert Sparrow & Lauren Karas, Teledildonics and Rape by Deception, 12 L., 
INNOVATION & TECH. 175, 195–96 (2020) (stressing the physiological differences in 
online masturbation and its significance to the law of rape). 
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people to masturbate in sexual ways without penetrations is left out 
of any rape doctrine: no penetration, no rape.168  However, 
normatively speaking, one certainly might suggest there should not 
be a difference between self-penetration and other forms of intimate 
self-touching.  One may certainly be sexually victimized, objectified, 
and humiliated, with self-penetration or without it.169 
On the other hand, self-penetration seems very different from 
penetration by another person’s organs or wielded inanimate objects.  
In the offline rape, the victim feels the offender’s body on top or 
against their own and might also feel the rapist’s fluids defile their 
body.  However, as we go online, the offender is not present, and the 
victim does not necessarily feel the self-penetration as an offender’s 
bodily invasion.  Therefore, the online transition makes the offensive 
scenario less intrusive.170  The offender’s scent and taste are also left 
out of the picture.  Even the offender’s proximity and visualization 
are missing, which lessens the physical invasiveness.  In these cases, 
the force of penetration is not determined by the offender, even with 
regards to insertion of inanimate objects, unless those objects are 
operated from a distance.171  The offender is less in control of the 
situation, which in turn means that less coercive pressure is 
experienced by the victim.172  Since the victim has more control over 
their own body, it might decrease any pain their touch may cause.  
This significant change of physics might alleviate the victim’s 
stressful experience. 
Looking at the physics of sexual offensiveness online reveals an 
exclusive method.173  Exploiting the victim and causing them to self-
 
168.  See id. (illustrating the differences of the possibility of penetration while using 
internet-enabled haptic sex toys between males and females while stating that if there 
is no penetration, there is no possibility of being raped). 
169.  See Conaghan, supra note 1, at 171–72 (stressing that sexual autonomy is violated 
even without penetration). 
170.  See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 195 (discussing the sensations essential to 
physical sexual acts, which are arguably not present in offline rape). 
171.  See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 125, at 1094; see also Sparrow & Karas, supra 
note 167, at 178 (discussing the possibility of remote operation of sex toys during 
online communications). 
172.  See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 125, at 1099–101 (discussing factors present in 
online interactions that limit the offender’s power such as the choice not to place a 
haptic device on one’s private areas, the ability to define an individual’s version of 
consent online, and the ability to change the user’s avatar). 
173.  Compare Baker, supra note 26, at 228 (discussing how an essential part of rape has 
been the non-consensual touching of certain parts of the body), with Sparrow & 
Karas, supra note 167, at 191 (discussing how the use of haptic technology can result 
in rape even when there is apparent consent or no physical touching by the predator). 
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execute the penetration introduces a unique method of violating the 
victim’s rights—there is no way around it for the perpetrator.  
Namely, we are not witnessing a nuance of a known sexual offense 
paradigm, but instead, a new paradigm of sexual offensiveness.174 
In addition, coercive rape requires the rapist to be aware that the 
victim does not consent.175  Criminal law doctrine requires the 
coercive rapist to be aware, in real time, that the penetration is 
against the victim’s free will.176  This doctrine sharpens the 
aggression and offensiveness of the physical act: the physical rapist 
must, physically or figuratively, meet the victim’s eyes and see their 
victimization in real time.177  The perpetrator might even find 
pleasure in hurting another victim’s body and soul, or experience 
sexual pleasure while seeing others suffer, objectified, and exploited.  
On the other hand, penetration by distant communication offers the 
perpetrator a convenient mental detachment from the experience of 
wronging another being.178  In offline rape by fraud, deception allows 
the perpetrator to avoid looking into the victim’s eyes while the latter 
realizes the truth and discovers victimization.179  In online self-
penetration by fraud, the perpetrator does not need to look into the 
eyes of the victim while they commit the offense.180 
 
174.  See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 196–97 (discussing the limitations on claims 
which can be brought if the use of internet-enabled haptic sex toys is deemed 
masturbation rather than sex). 
175.  See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 1073–74 (claiming that dominant social norms 
discourage partners from recognizing cues of non-consent). 
176.  See Victoria Brown et al., Review Article, Twenty-First Annual Review of Gender 
and the Law: Annual Review Article: Rape & Sexual Assault, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
367, 373 (2020) (writing that most states have provisions banning sexual contact that 
is coerced, or that the perpetrator knew was not consented to). 
177.  See generally An Updated Definition of Rape, supra note 38 (explaining U.S. Justice 
Department’s rape definition and the difference between rape and forcible rape). 
178.  See generally Heather Murphy, What Experts Know About Men Who Rape, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/health/men-rape-sexual-
assault.html [https://perma.cc/2HUZ-6JQP] (“Indeed, experts note one last trait 
shared by men who have raped: they do not believe they are the problem.”). 
179.  See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 48 
(1998) (explaining rape by deception). 
180.  See generally Jan M. Olsen, Swedish Man Gets 10 Years for Online Rape of 
American, Canadian Teens, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2017, 9:24 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/11/30/sex-offenses-online-rape-
parenting-teens/911966001/ [https://perma.cc/JK6G-C8MU] (“A 41-year-old Swedish 
man was convicted of rape and sentenced to 10 years in prison . . . for coercing young 
teenagers . . . to perform sexual acts in front of webcams by threatening them or their 
families.”). 
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Further, the experience of the offender is inherently different.181  
The offender’s senses do not experience the online scenario as they 
do offline.182  The offender does not get to touch and smell; at times, 
the offender does not get to hear; sometimes the offender does not 
even get to see; and when the offender does see, the sight is relatively 
limited.183  If the act is filmed, the offender can review the recorded 
crime and revisit it later,184 disseminate or use it to further blackmail, 
or employ other forms of criminality that typical coercive rapes may 
not include.185 
C.  Cyber Rape: The Settings Leading to Communicative Rape 
There is nothing inherently wrong with sexual penetrations.  Many 
of us practice them, desire them, and fantasize about them, as human 
culture is widely and deeply sexual.186  What makes sexual 
penetrations criminal is not their physics, but rather how they are 
carried out—i.e., their settings, the lack of consent to sex, or 
defective consent.187  The normative foundations of rape are sexual 
penetrations combined with the violation of personal autonomy.188 
 
181.  See infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text. 
182.  See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
183.  See generally Jenny Morber, What Science Says About Arousal During Rape, 
POPULAR SCI. (May 31, 2013), https://www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-05/scie 
nce-arousal-during-rape/ [https://perma.cc/G8YM-Q7VG] (explaining that rapists 
often try to get a physical response from their victims to feel dominant). 
184.  See Kelly Muldavin, Cruel to Be Kind: The Societal Response to Technology and 
Youth Sexual Expression, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 425, 446–47 (2019) (explaining 
the lasting dangers in taking and sending sexual pictures to others). 
185.  See Danielle Citron & Mary Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); see Berkseth et al., supra note 31, at 808–11 (describing the 
phenomenon of revenge porn, which includes the dissemination and watching of 
private sex); see John Kip Corwell, Sexting: 21st-Century Statutory Rape, 66 SMU L. 
REV. 111, 115 (2013) (describing the intrusion to privacy in technological sexual 
contents); see also Stuart P. Green, To See and Be Seen: Reconstructing the Law of 
Voyeurism and Exhibitionism, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203, 209–10, 214–39 (2018) 
(analyzing the proper criminalization of voyeurism and claiming that it significantly 
infringes the victim’s sexual autonomy due to lack of consent). 
186.  See Justin R. Garcia et al., Sexual Hookup Culture: A Review, 16 R. GEN. PSYCH. 161, 
161–63 (2012) (analyzing the differences in sexual relationships throughout history). 
187.  See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape 
as Sexual Abuse of Power, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 150 (2011) (explaining that 
the common law definition of rape included both a lack of consent and a physical act 
of violence). 
188.  See supra text accompanying notes 1–5. 
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Under the notion of personal autonomy, one is free to be harmed if 
they so choose, even when others deem this choice folly,189 thus 
denying paternalism as the subjugation of self-determination to the 
notion of what is best for that person.190  Personal autonomy wields 
the power of consent.191  It plays important roles in numerous fields 
of law.192  It relates to human rights, making moral changes and 
turning illegal actions into legal ones.193  Consent can sometimes 
modify an array of rights and suspend duties to act or to avoid acting 
in certain manners.194  Substantive criminal law treats people as 
rational and turns compliance into a wall that separates accepted 
actions and criminalized actions.195  Consent is often the sole 
difference between criminal and legal acts, as its absence begets a 
social harm; “volenti non fit injuria,” meaning to one who is willing 
no harm is done.196  Consent excludes various offenses like rape, 
kidnapping, theft, and burglary.197 
 
189.  See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 
115 (1984) (illustrating consensual self-harm). 
190.  See FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 57, 68–69; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 47, at 765 
(explaining paternalism). 
191.  See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO 
STATE J. CRIM. L. 397, 402 (2016) (describing consent as a power and as an internal 
mental choice with willed acquiescence that comports with the consenter’s 
autonomy); see Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. 2232, 
2235 (2020) (explaining that consent is morally important because it expresses 
personal autonomous will); see also Chiesa, supra note 46, at 426 (portraying consent 
as “the vehicle through which legal actors translate concerns about autonomy into 
legally workable standards and rules.”). 
192.  See Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions About Consent in Rape Cases, 2 OHIO 
STATE J. CRIM. L. 333, 333 (2004) (illustrating the role of consent in contract, 
property, and tort law); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 21 (2015) (noting consent has different meanings across 
various areas of law including a relatively broad definition in criminal law). 
193.  See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121, 124 
(1996). 
194.  See Westen, supra note 192, at 334. 
195.  See Vanessa E. Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating 
Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 923, 924 (2008) 
(explaining the role of consent in criminal law). 
196.  Volenti non fit injuria, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Vera 
Bergelson, Lecture, The 2008 David J. Stoffer Lecture: Autonomy, Dignity, and 
Consent to Harm, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 723 (2008). 
197.  See Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 171–74 (2007) (elaborating on the history of consent in 
substantive criminal law). 
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Although the role of consent is not always coherent,198 at least in 
some cases, its importance is clear.199  It defines the line between 
legal and illegal, between social acceptance and criminalization.200  
Consent has a crucial function in the rape offense, signaling the 
moral line between criminal and socially accepted sexual contact.201  
Nevertheless, although rape scholarship revolves around consent,202 
it remains a vague concept203—in spite of being the most discussed 
term regarding this offense—and there is no unified understanding 
regarding this critical issue.204 
Consent is a vague concept because is not a narrow notion, but a 
very expansive one.  One might wonder if it is a mental state or an 
expression,205 or suggest diverse and complex ways to distinguish 
various forms of consent: factual consent versus legal consent, 
practical consent versus imputed consent, and so forth.206  Indeed, it 
has both a generic meaning and a very specific meaning 
simultaneously.207  So it is not always clear what we mean when we 
say there is no consent. 
 
198.  Dan-Cohen, supra note 47, at 768–73 (discussing consensual slavery); see Bergelson, 
supra note 197, at 214–25; see Bergelson, supra note 196, at 729–34. 
199.  See Bergelson, supra note 197, at 214–25. 
200.  See supra text accompanying notes 187–97. 
201.  See supra text accompanying notes 187–97. 
202.  ESTRICH, supra note 37, at 1095–96, 1121; TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 90–136 
(analyzing consent regarding rape); see also Craig T. Byrnes, Comment, Putting the 
Focus Where It Belongs: Mens Rea, Consent, Force, and the Crime of Rape, 10 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 277, 278, 283 (1998) . 
203.  See Munro, supra note 195, at 940–41 (noting the deeply distorted meaning of 
consent, which has become unrecognizable and useless in the rape law context; 
calling to rephrase the term of consent to clarify rape law). 
204.  See Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the 
Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 958–59 (2008). 
205.  See Westen, supra note 192, at 340–43; see also PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF 
CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT 4–7 (Routledge 2016) (2004) (elaborating on the four basic 
notions of consent). 
206.  Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the 
Evaporation of Consent to Sex, 41 AKRON L. REV. 899, 902–04 (2008); see Westen, 
supra note 192, at 340–41; see also H.M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent 
and its Implications for the Law on Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 147, 148 (1996) 
(discussing the meaning of consent). 
207.  See Westen, supra note 192, at 342–44. 
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Typically, we mean one of four options.208  First, we might mean 
there is a complete lack of consent in light of the victim’s persistent 
refusal, or due to the victim’s lack of any knowledge of the act.209  
Second, we might mean that consent is not freely given, but derived 
from direct coercion.210  Third, the consent is uninformed because 
compliance is based on false understandings of the scenario, the 
requested act and its consequences, the identity and traits of the 
requesting party, and so forth.211  Fourth and finally, the consent is 
incompetently given because some people are considered legally 
unfit to consent to some acts.212 
Section I.A described three types of offensive sex: coercive sex, 
fraudulent sex, and sex with an incompetent victim.213  Each type of 
violation involves a different level of consent, protecting a different 
layer of sexual autonomy by assessing freedom, information, and 
competency.214  Can the levels of consent be violated from a 
distance, and are these violations normatively equal to their offline 
counterparts? 
D.  Cyber-Coercive  
Coercion is more than force, much more.  Indeed, many laws do 
not count sex based on nonphysical coercion as rape.215  However, 
even an insinuated threat—e.g., a threat of public humiliation or of 
 
208.  See Green, supra note 46, at 212–14; see also Chiesa, supra note 46, at 422–23 
(measuring consent and autonomy along the dimensions of non-coercion, 
competency, and information). 
209.  See Green, supra note 46, at 212. 
210.  See Bergelson, supra note 197, at 188–89 (explaining that even freedom from direct 
coercion is extremely valuable); see also Munro, supra note 195, at 924, 931 
(addressing exploitive practices that challenge the freedom of choice). 
211.  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 344–45 
(2013) (stressing the imperfection of information in any decision to have sex). 
212.  See Green, supra note 46, at 212 (describing the capacity to consent and explaining 
that a person who is unconscious, heavily intoxicated, of very low intelligence, 
mentally ill, or a minor may be deemed incapable of giving consent). 
213.  See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text. 
214.  See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text. 
215.  Hanus, supra note 26, at 1149, 1151 (stating that many U.S. states do not criminalize 
rape by nonphysical coercion and the states that do criminalize nonphysical coercive 
sex as rape lack supporting case law); see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent and 
Coercion, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 969–70, 992–93 (2018) (analyzing draft revisions to 
the Model Penal Code dealing with “Sexual Assault by Coercion or Exploitation,” 
including intercourse by coercion and proposing an alternative“Sex by Threat”). 
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termination from employment216—can be effective without the use of 
force or weapons.217  Sometimes, for example, when the victim feels 
compelled to do anything asked by the perpetrator, threats are not 
needed.218  If we think free will is worthy of protection, we should 
not consider the use or threat of force as a crucial element for rape 
convictions.219  Those who believe criminal coercion includes more 
than force and threats of force might agree coercion is even possible 
online. 
What happens to free will in cyberspace?  Freedom of consent is 
certainly vulnerable online.220  Social pressures can push sexual 
actions online, along with blackmail or “sextortion.”221  A person 
might threaten and blackmail another into action, including self-
penetration.  Blackmail might work from great distances, for instance 
by threatening to publish intimate photos, because such threats have 
nothing to do with physical proximity.  Even if threats and 
intimidation tactics are in some respects weaker from afar because 
coercion is off the table, freedom is never completely safe.222  Fear 
and terror can rise from great distances.  Obviously, blackmail 
scenarios severely violate freedom of consent.223  But is this violation 
 
216.  GREEN, supra note 28, at 117–22 (reviewing coercive threats and describing 
hypothetical scenarios); see Ferzan, supra note 215, at 976–77; see also Michal 
Buchhandler–Raphael, Criminalizing Coerced Submission in the Workplace and in 
the Academy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 442–44 (2010) (discussing threats that 
lead to intercourse).  
217.  See Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 339 (describing a continuum of force, including 
various threats). 
218.  See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for 
Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 718–19 (2000) (discussing scenarios of peer 
pressure and non-force coercion). 
219.  Baker, supra note 26, at 228 (stressing that disregarding and “[o]verriding the 
victim’s will that she not to be touched in that particular area by that particular person 
constitutes the gravamen of rape”); see also Hanus, supra note 26, at 1168–70 
(arguing to criminalize nonphysical coercion of sex as rape and suggesting that the 
rationales of criminalizing rape also apply to nonphysical coercion of sex). 
220.  See, e.g., Aaron Robbins, Note, Solving the Sextortion Puzzle: Piecing Together a 
Model State Sextortion Statute, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 761, 761–62, 764–65 (2019) 
(describing nonconsensual sextortion in an online dating scenario and explaining that 
threats are the basis for sextortion). 
221.  See id. at 763, 768–73 (defining and illustrating sextortion using U.S. legal cases); see 
also Muldavin, supra note 184, at 441–43, 447–50 (discussing the problem of teen 
peer pressure for sexting and the problem of sextortion). 
222.  See Robbins, supra note 220, at 766–67. 
223.  See Falk, supra note 179, at 52, 73, 86 (discussing sex by extortion as rape and 
describing cases of blackmail). 
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normatively equal to the violation entailed in a physically coercive 
rape? 
Autonomy is not binary but scalar.224  While our freedom of choice 
is vulnerable online, autonomy is not annihilated completely in 
cyberspace and in other forms of distant communication.225  We 
enjoy one special form of privilege there—the freedom to 
instantaneously cease and terminate communication without facing 
immediate physical danger.  Closing online windows is the simplest 
of actions, one done numerous times daily by any user (minors and 
children included).  One can also simply block specific users, which 
is a miserable one and by no means an ideal choice.  Nevertheless, a 
fragment of personal autonomy remains—the capacity to choose 
between cooperation and other forms of action.  The latter includes 
ignoring the demand and terminating all communications with the 
blackmailer; seeking help of parents, family, friends and community; 
and finally, calling the police.226  Those are all risky choices, and we 
must not judge victims who succumb to criminal tactics.  Still, these 
choices are more available and accessible in online coercion than in 
direct physical coercion.227  In the offline world, victims who choose 
to resist potentially put themselves in further danger.228  Physical 
rapists who coerce victims to perform acts of self-penetration might 
threaten violence if the victim refuses to comply by moving to 
perform the penetration with their own physical organs or objects, 
often much more brutally.229  This is not the case for victims who are 
physically distant from the perpetrators.230 
Theoretically, all victims are potentially stronger from a distance 
when not required to physically defend themselves, a danger which 
often arises in physical confrontations, even for unconscious 
 
224.  Chiesa, supra note 46, at 423 (arguing that autonomy is scalar and includes different 
degrees). 
225.  See id. at 425–26 (“The degree of autonomy that obtains in any given situation is 
directly proportional to the amount of information that the agent has prior to acting.”). 
226.  See Muldavin, supra note 184, at 449–50 (discussing infrequent reporting in 
sextortion cases). 
227.  See infra notes 228–32 and accompanying text. 
228.  See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 1056 (stressing that the resistance element in rape law 
requires the victim to place themself in danger of increased force and injury).  But see 
Baker, supra note 26, at 255 (arguing that resistance is effective in reducing rape, 
while not increasing the chances of injury). 
229.  See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 196. 
230.  See id. at 181–82. 
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victims.231  Similarly, victims of subtler online coercion have more 
options than victims who physically confront the coercing party.232 
E.  Cyber-Deceitful 
The law of rape does not forbid intercourse derived from fraudulent 
temptation, as long as the deceived party was well aware of agreeing 
to intercourse.233  At most, Anglo-American law criminalizes a very 
narrow array of sex by fraud, like “medical treatment,” which 
involves intercourse or impersonation of a spouse in the dark of 
night.234  These acts are often considered lighter offenses, or even not 
criminalized at all.235  Nonetheless, since fraud and autonomy are not 
compatible,236 fraudulent sex is, by definition, offensive and violates 
the victim’s sexual autonomy.237  If we perceive fraudulent sex as 
problematic, and possibly even as rape, we can go one step further 
and examine the potential of fraud from afar. 
What happens to sexual fraud in cyberspace?  Honesty and trust, 
important social values,238 which are seemingly protected under the 
doctrine of rape by fraud, are actually more vulnerable to 
manipulation from a distance.239 
 
231.  See Falk, supra note 59, at 131–33 (stressing that many sedated victims wake up in 
the middle of the sexual attack). 
232.  See supra notes 220–31 and accompanying text. 
233.  See McJunkin, supra note 28, at 9–12. 
234.  Id. at 8–9 (stressing Nebraska is the only state with a broad rape statute that 
criminalizes all fraud relating to nominal identity; however, no state court has ever 
affirmed a rape conviction for impersonating a boyfriend, girlfriend, lover, or friend); 
Hong, supra note 28, at 287–88; Alexandra Brodksy, Rape-Adjacent: Imagining 
Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Condom Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
183, 197–98 (2017) (criticizing U.S. laws related to consensual sex involving 
nonconsensual lack of condom use or removal); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 46, at 
1397–1402. 
235.  See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by 
Fraud as a Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 92–97 (2007) (noting 
that less than a third of American jurisdictions criminalize impersonating a spouse for 
sex as rape). 
236.  Sommers, supra note 191, at 2239–40 (explaining that deception thwarts autonomy); 
see also Rubenfeld, supra note 46, at 1379, 1402–03 (emphasizing that fraud“one 
of autonomy’s two greatest enemies, along with force”violates sexual autonomy). 
237.  See Kristen L. Isaacson, Note, Rape by Fraud or Impersonation: A Necessary 
Addition to Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1781, 
1799–1800 (1999) (writing that because sexual contact obtained by fraud or 
impersonation is devoid of consent, it breaches sexual autonomy). 
238.  See Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 557, 564–66 (2009) (elaborating on the value of trust). 
239.  See Susser et al., supra note 50, at 29, 31–32. 
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Online we often do not see the counterpart who contacts us.240  It is 
therefore hard to identify who is on the other side—as it may be a 
man or a woman, an adult or a minor, and so on—because we often 
lack any visible hints.241  Online relationships depend less on the 
visible traits which are crucial offline;242 therefore, informed consent 
is more challenging to obtain than in the physical realm.243  Passing 
information to others seems almost inherently more vague and often 
also dubious online. 
Fraud is much easier online than in the physical world, because 
one’s online identity can be elusive and malleable.244  Identity can be 
easily disguised and hidden, concealing material information from 
the other party.245  In real life, a seventy-year-old male cannot 
impersonate a seven-year-old girl—his appearance and voice will 
expose him immediately.  In the digital world, on the other hand, he 
surely and easily can.246  Unlike offline encounters, cyberspace 
enables users to portray themselves differently.247  It is not surprising 
that impersonation is pervasive in social networks.248  The 
 
240.  See infra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
241.  This is not a new observation.  See Sara Kiesler et al., Social Psychological Aspects of 
Computer-Mediated Communication, 39 AM. PSYCH. 1123, 1125–26 (1984). 
242.  See JOANIE FARLEY GILLISPIE & JAYNE GACKENBACH, CYBER RULES: WHAT YOU 
REALLY NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE INTERNET 86 (2007) (suggesting that online 
relationships are less dependent on visible traits, which are crucial offline). 
243.  See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 199–201. 
244.  See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 125, at 1100–01 (stressing the easiness of  online 
impersonations and the challenges of consent). 
245.  See Nazgole Hashemi & Tannaz H. Hashemi, Don’t Let Them Fool Ya: An 
Examination of Regulation Crowdfunding as a Framework for Federal Protection 
Against Online Dating Risks, 53 U. S.F. L. REV. 421, 428–32 (2019) (explaining the 
dangers of deception in online dating). 
246.  See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
247.  See Katelyn McKenna & Gwendolyn Seidman, You, Me, and We: Interpersonal 
Processes in Electronic Groups, in THE SOCIAL NET: HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN 
CYBERSPACE 191, 207 (Yair Amichai-Hamburger ed., 2005) (portraying the 
uniqueness of electronic communication). 
248.  Kori Clanton, Note, We Are Not Who We Pretend to Be: ODR Alternatives to Online 
Impersonation Statutes, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 323, 325–29 (2014) 
(addressing the failure to hold social media platforms liable for identity theft); Colleen 
M. Koch, Comment, To Catch a Catfish: A Statutory Solution for Victims of Online 
Impersonation, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 233, 239–45, 248–51 (2017) (analyzing identity 
theft on social networks and the legal responses thereto); see also Maksim Reznik, 
Comment, Identity Theft on Social Networking Sites: Developing Issues of Internet 
Impersonation, 29 TOURO L. REV. 455, 457–72 (2013) (explaining common forms of 
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information highway promises no informed consent, as lies and 
deception are abundant on every road.249  Some of those deceitful 
roads lead to physical encounters, including romantic and sexual 
ones.250  Other roads lead to sexual communication, some of which 
lead to self-penetrations.251  Technology offers greater opportunities 
for deception, and provides a vaster, more diverse pool of potential 
victims.252 
While impersonation and deception seem easier and richer online, 
in certain contexts they are harder and perhaps also less appealing for 
the offenders.253  Impersonating a real person, rather than a fictitious 
one, may prove tricky.  For instance, impersonating one’s spouse 
online is far from easy, for one usually has specific communication 
mediums with their spouse; and even when one gains access to that 
medium, the transition to sexual communication is more complicated 
because sexual interaction between spouses already has specific 
features, times, and places.254  Impersonating a physician online is 
not difficult, but gaining enough trust to falsely move another into 
self-penetration is more complicated.255  The perpetrators’ motivation 
and satisfaction in such acts are certainly different, as they cannot 
touch, smell, or even be physically close to their victim.256 
 
identity theft on social media—e.g., the creation of fake accounts and impersonating 
existing accounts). 
249.  See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 186–92 (stressing that cyberspace facilitates 
deception in various contexts). 
250.  See Irina D. Manta, Tinder Lies, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207, 230–35 (2019) 
(analyzing the different types of lies used on dating websites based on their severity). 
251.  See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 178–79 (analyzing futuristic self-
penetrations that will be done remotely by digital online sex toys). 
252.  See Manta, supra note 250, at 234–35 (stressing the increase of opportunities for 
wrongdoers concerning technology). 
253.  See, e.g., Scott Matteson, 10 Tips for Dealing with an Online Impersonator, 
TECHREPUBLIC (July 1, 2019, 10:17 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/10-tip 
s-for-dealing-with-an-online-impersonator/ [https://perma.cc/9BLA-Z44W] (examin-
ing the difficulties of online impersonation). 
254.  See Christopher & Christopher, supra note 235, at 99102; see, e.g., Victor 
Luckerson, Can You Go to Jail for Impersonating Someone Online?, TIME (Jan. 22, 
2013), https://business.time.com/2013/01/22/can-you-go-to-jail-for-impersonating-so 
meone-online/ [https://perma.cc/A88F-N5HX] (describing intimate partner 
impersonation). 
255.  See Christopher & Christopher, supra note 235, at 84; see, e.g., State v. Maxwell, 825 
A.2d 1224, 1225–27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (detailing case involving 
defendant who impersonated a physician to coerce minors into self-penetration). 
256.  See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. 
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F.  Cyber-Incompetent 
Historically, the statutory rape offense criminalized sex with young 
females, including consensual sex, perceiving them as in need of 
special legal protection, and defending their “innocence” to preserve 
the girls as attractive potential brides and prevent them from 
becoming “financial burdens” on their fathers.257  The modern 
statutory rape offense is gender-neutral,258 and it now seeks to 
preserve morality or protect minors from themselves, perceiving 
them as easily susceptible to coercion and manipulation.259 It also 
tries to prevent physical consequences like pregnancy and sexually 
transmitted diseases.260  If we perceive teenagers and children as 
susceptible to sexual abuse and incapable of providing meaningful 
consent to sexual acts, we can take it a step further. 
What happens to sexual incompetency online?  Cyberspace 
requires minimal hardware, software, and connection—it does not 
account for legal competency.261  In fact, minors abound in 
cyberspace, probably at higher rates than adults.262  Minors converse 
 
257.  Meredith Cohen, Comment, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717, 725–27 
(2008); Lisa Pearlstein, Note, Walking the Tightrope of Statutory Rape Law: Using 
International Legal Standards to Serve the Best Interests of Juvenile Offenders and 
Victims, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 111–12 (2010) (describing the history of statutory 
rape); see also Tina M. Allen, Comment, Gender-Neutral Statutory Rape Laws: Legal 
Fictions Disguised as Remedies to Male Child Exploitation, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 111, 112–13 (2002). 
258.  Note, Feminist Legal Analysis and Sexual Autonomy: Using Statutory Rape Laws as 
an Illustration, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076, 1080–81 (1999) (noting that statutory 
rape laws protect vulnerable minors from harms of sexual activities); see also 
Olszewski, supra note 56, at 695. 
259.  High, supra note 56, at 791 (writing that public discourse focuses on minors’ 
presumed immaturity and inexperience and their susceptibility to sexual manipulation 
and coercion); see also Norah M. Roth, Note, It’s Not Rape-Rape: Statutory Rape 
Classification Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1653, 
1676 (2011) (claiming that adolescents may be particularly susceptible to 
manipulation and coercion by adults). 
260.  Pearlstein, supra note 257, at 112–13 (describing how teenage pregnancy rekindled 
the enforcement of statutory rape in the 1990s); Oberman, supra note 218, at 734–38 
(attacking the historic rationale of teenage pregnancy); see High, supra note 56, at 
822 (noting various harms of underage sex); see also Elizabeth Hollenberg, Note, The 
Criminalization of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage 
Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 269–71 (1999). 
261.  See infra notes 262–76 and accompanying text. 
262.  See Emily DiRoma, Comment, Kids Say the Darndest Things: Minors and the 
Internet, 2019 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 43, 47 (2018) (citing Amanda Lenhart, 
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with each other and adults online, sometimes about sex, and 
sometimes while touching themselves in a sexual manner.263  
Unlike truth and awareness, which are often made to be vague 
online, it is hard to say if and how cyberspace affects competency.  
Competency falls in the realm of formal law and is not an objective 
state.264  If competency is an age-based trait, cyberspace cannot do 
anything in that respect; it makes no one older or younger.265  
However, if competency is about personal abilities, perhaps 
cyberspace does affect it somehow. 
One might argue that cyberspace has no such effects, and that 
minors are as vulnerable as beforeor even more sobecause of the 
gap between sophisticated and experienced adults versus innocent 
minors online.  Innocence can surely be exploited online, specifically 
when it comes to minors and other incompetent victims.266 
Alternatively, if innocence is what statutory rape aims to protect, 
we are losing the battle in certain respects.267  Before cyberspace, 
 
Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2015), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-201 
5/ [https://perma.cc/3VVW-HKF6]) (stressing the major role of the internet in 
children and teenage lives nowadays). 
263.  See Muldavin, supra note 184, at 427, 437–40 (discussing how teen internet and 
mobile phone use has normalized teenage sexual exploration via sexting). 
264.  See High, supra note 56, at 794 (arguing the approach to competency in the realm of 
statutory rape law is problematic as an objective bright-line rule and not as a 
subjective spectrum). 
265.  See Chester & Bretherton, supra note 146, at 223–24. 
266 . DJ Mico, Protecting the Digital Playgrounds: Narrowly Tailoring the Meaning of 
“Social Media” to Prohibit Sexual Predators from Using Social Media, 51 U. PAC. L. 
REV. 123, 124–25 (2019); Marilyn M. McMahon & Elizabeth A. Kirley, When Cute 
Becomes Criminal: Emoji, Threats and Online Grooming, 21 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
37, 60–61 (2019); Stephen Beemsterboer, Student-Written Article, COPPA Killed the 
Video Star: How the YouTube Settlement Shows that COPPA Does More Harm Than 
Good, 25 ILL. BUS. L.J. 63, 73–74 (2020); Jaynee Mathis, Updating the Law to Keep 
Pace with Newsfeeds and Online Victimization: The Need for Limited Access to Sex 
Offenders’ Online Identifiers, 49 SW. L. REV. 169, 179–80 (2020); Justine Wagner, 
Immersive Virtual Reality: Minnesota Legislature’s Opportunity to Protect Children 
from Sexual Exploitation by Enacting a Well-Defined Criminal Statute, 46 MITCHELL 
HAMLINE L. REV. 407, 412–14 (2020) (highlighting the increased internet access of 
children and their vulnerability to sexual abuse online); see also Kelsey K. Chetosky, 
Comment, Minnesota v. Muccio: The Constitutionality of Minnesota’s Sexual 
Grooming Law, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2–3 (2019). 
267.  Jordan Franklin, Comment, Where Art Thou, Privacy?: Expanding Privacy Rights of 
Minors in Regard to Consensual Sex: Statutory Rape Laws and the Need for A 
“Romeo and Juliet” Exception in Illinois, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 309, 317 (2012) 
(arguing that the legislative intent behind statutory rape laws is to protect the 
innocence of children); see also Cohen, supra note 257, at 727–28. 
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children were less exposed to pornography because they could not 
access it so easily.268  For a while now, the reality has been materially 
different.269  Pornography is but a fraction of the problematic content 
available online.270  Technology and social practices have changed 
and sexual content is everywhere.271 
One might suggest that the amount of sexual content exposure 
online means that many adolescents are more curious and interested 
in some forms of sexual activity.272  Even if it makes us 
uncomfortable, adolescents are sexual creatures and they engage in 
sexual acts both online273 and offline.274  Even if contributing to their 
decision to engage in sexual activity online is potentially harmful, 
one might claim that it is not as harmful as having physical 
intercourse.  Perhaps the legal protection should be different, 
thinking that their capacity to consent to online communication is 
 
268.  Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1203, 1239–40 (2000) (stressing that children’s access to pornography changes 
dramatically online, making the compartmentalization of pornography difficult); see 
also Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 503–04 (1999). 
269.  Michael D. Birnhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children: The European 
Way, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 175, 181 (2004) (noting that children have free, instant, 
and anonymous access to extreme sexual content, and there are no significant 
limitations on children’s exposure to pornography); see also Daniel Mark Cohen, 
Unhappy Anniversary: Thirty Years Since Miller v. California: The Legacy of the 
Supreme Court’s Misjudgment on Obscenity, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 545, 552 (2003). 
270.  See Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 
34–40 (2004) (maintaining that children’s exposure to violent content is more harmful 
than their exposure to pornography, yet this content is widespread and unbound by 
law); see also Scott A. Pyle, Note, Is Violence Really Just Fun and Games?: A 
Proposal for a Violent Video Game Ordinance That Passes Constitutional Muster, 37 
VAL. U. L. REV. 429, 479–82 (2002) (discussing the possibility of limiting children’s 
exposure to violent video games). 
271.  See GREEN, supra note 28, at 194 (claiming that new technologies and new social 
practices have “lowered the threshold of what society regards as private while 
increasing the potential for resulting harm to victims”). 
272.  Muldavin, supra note 184, at 441–42 (discussing how modern media influences 
young people to engage in sexual exploration via sexting); see also High, supra note 
56, at 787–88 (noting how the Internet exposes youth to sexual content more than 
ever before). 
273.  See Airelle Mills, Juvenile Sexting: A Harsh Reality, 43 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
ONLINE 3, 5–6 (2019); see also Muldavin, supra note 184, at 437–40 (describing teen 
peer sexting as a normalized part of teenage lives). 
274.  See High, supra note 56, at 796–97, 837 (stressing that intercourse and other sexual 
acts are common among American youth, including those legally unable to consent). 
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somewhat wider than their capacity to consent to physical sex.275  On 
the other hand, considering their limited capacities and greater 
vulnerabilities to other ways of violating their sexual autonomy—
including coercion and deception—we should provide them with 
greater legal protection.276 
G. Cyber Rape: Proper Labeling and Public Paradigm 
Rape is clearly a unique offense known to be extremely 
traumatic.277  It invokes severe legal and social stigmatization.278  
Only a handful of offenses enflame such social loathing.279  Criminal 
stigma is a powerful condemnation tool.280  This tool loses parts of its 
vitality as the offense grows ever wider: the more the offense 
expands, the vaguer its social message will become.281  Because the 
legal label of “rapist” is significant, it is important to use it carefully 
and coherently.282 
 
275.  A minor’s increased ability to consent in online communication is based on the 
assumption that the other party is not fraudulent (a matter related to rape by fraud and 
not to statutory rape).  See Milda Macenaite & Eleni Kosta, Consent for Processing 
Children’s Personal Data in the EU: Following in US Footsteps?, 26 INFO. & 
COMMC’NS TECH. L. 146, 15455 (2017). 
276.  See Muldavin, supra note 184, at 443–52 (analyzing how sexual coercions involving 
sexting harms teenagers). 
277.  Baker, supra note 26, at 253–54; Mary Graw Leary, Affirmatively Replacing Rape 
Culture with Consent Culture, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2016) (claiming that 
rape inflicts one of the most severe types of traumas, with long-term adverse 
outcomes); Aya Gruber, Rape Law Revisited, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279, 282–83 
(2016) (arguing that the separation between rape and sex is trauma); Yung, supra note 
192, at 20–21 (distinguishing rape from ordinary batteries, stating the former includes 
a violation of an individual’s psyche with high risks of physiological and 
psychological effects, like post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and suicide); see 
also Allen, supra note 26, at 1075.  
278.  See John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OFFENCES AND 
DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 1, 4–6, 8–9 (John 
Gardner ed., 1st ed. 2008). 
279.  See Allen, supra note 26, at 1037. 
280.  See id. at 1053–54 (illustrating the role of stigma; defining stigma as the marking of a 
person, identifying them as criminal, deviant, and otherwise deserving of ostracism 
and condemnation). 
281.  See Green, supra note 46, at 219–20. 
282.  Id. (arguing “autonomy is a highly variegated concept,” and that some of its facets are 
more important than others); TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 67 (discussing the proposition 
of introducing a severity ladder to rape law); see also Glanville Williams, Rape is 
Rape, 142 NEW L.J. 11, 13 (1992) (stressing the importance of distinguishing between 
different types of rape). 
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In the context of criminal law, rape is a legal term established by a 
legislature and a normative component entailing two possible 
messages.283  The name often tells a social story; however, the 
unification of several scenarios under one title or term as opposed to 
separate offenses and designations sends another message.284  The 
notion of proper labeling suggests that an offense should accurately 
describe the forbidden conduct, to precisely convey the wrongness 
and harmfulness it entails, and to reflect the differing levels of 
severity for different actions.285  The law must fairly represent the 
nature and harshness of the violation.286  This is the principle of fair 
labeling.287 
The legal label of a crime can be very valuable.  While reviewing 
someone’s criminal record, the legal label signals to the public and 
authorities the message of who a person is.288  It has an expressive 
meaning289 and must be as accurate and sharp as possible.290  Names 
for offenses send social messages and should be as clear as possible, 
even if other forces will modify them later.291 An accurate label is 
beneficial to public perception.292  The public cognitively relates 
labels to what people know and think of certain words; the public’s 
perception is important for social condemnation, which is essential to 
substantive criminal law.293 
 
283.  See TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 67. 
284.  See Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Community Perceptions of Theft 
Seriousness: A Challenge to Model Penal Code and English Theft Act Consolidation, 
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 511 (2010). 
285.  See C.M.V. Clarkson, Theft and Fair Labeling, 56 MOD. L. REV. 554, 554–55 (1993). 
286.  See Green & Kugler, supra note 284, at 515–16. 
287.  See STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 52–54 (2012) (explaining the principle of fair labeling). 
288.  See Hong, supra note 28, at 269. 
289.  Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 539, 
546 (2000); Hong, supra note 28, at 292 (discussing expressive powers of law); see 
also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 391, 397–400 (1997) (portraying the expressive power of law as 
equal to its coercive power). 
290.  See Chiesa, supra note 46, at 419 (noting that “the law often needs to adopt bright line 
rules” to clarify “vague moral standards”). 
291.  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 520–23 (2001) (stressing that the expressive power of legislators is impeded by 
the police, the prosecution, and the courts). 
292.  See GREEN, supra note 28, at 72 (stressing laws should recognize the degrees of 
blameworthiness viewed between two or more types of conduct in legal cases). 
293.  See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
401, 404–05 (1958) (reviewing the role of condemnation in criminal law). 
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Whenever it is published that a person has been convicted of a 
certain crime without any specific details, we can assume that the 
public’s perception will cognitively relate it to the social paradigm of 
that crime.294  So, if we label offenses regardless of what the public 
knows and perceives, we might lose the communicative power of the 
offense’s meaning and the related benefits in terms of labeling.  An 
accurate label is not only fair to perpetrators and victims; it also 
sharply clarifies the harms caused by the offense, the dangerousness 
of the offenders, and perhaps also possible strategies and tactics for 
the public’s protection in accordance with those dangers.295 
This general approach also applies to rape.296  Proper labeling 
means not only fairness to offenders, but also benefits to the public, 
marking the severity and the danger of the offense.297  When looking 
at the offline world, the dangers presented by coercive and fraudulent 
sex, as well those presented by sexual acts committed with an 
incompetent individual, are quite different.298 
The danger of coercive rape is ignoring another’s free will with the 
preparedness to violate it,299 thus the accurate legal warning is to stay 
away from that person, and to avoid physical proximity and contact.  
The danger of fraudulent rape is different, using social manipulation 
and abuse of trust, and therefore the accurate legal warning should 
tell people to be extremely careful when accepting someone’s claims 
as truth and in relying on their assertions.300  The danger of statutory 
rape is different as well—i.e., sexual attraction to minors301—and the 
legal warning would be to keep our children away. 
What happens to the above dangers in cyberspace?  Physical 
consequences like pregnancy and transmitted diseases are 
 
294.  See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 473 
(1976) (discussing the image of thieves and how that image influenced criminal law). 
295.  See Clarkson, supra note 285, at 554–55. 
296.  See Green, supra note 46, at 220 (emphasizing the importance of fair labeling in rape 
law). 
297.  See GREEN, supra note 28, at 72. 
298.  See infra text accompanying notes 299–301. 
299.  But see Conaghan, supra note 1, at 175 (pointing to the understanding of the essential 
harm of rape as the erasure of women’s subjectivity). 
300.  See Falk, supra note 179, at 50–51 (stressing that sex by fraud often involves a special 
kind of sexual predator who uses the same method against multiple victims, 
sometimes strategically, thus separating them from forceful rapists). 
301.  Attraction between minors is different than attraction between minors and adults, and 
attraction by adults to children is very different than attraction by adults to teenagers 
nearing adulthood.  See PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
ON THE INTERNET 27 (2001) (distinguishing adult attraction to adolescents from adult 
attraction to children). 
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theoretically impossible.302  Outside the technological scenarios, rape 
is when perpetrators and victims are present at the same place at the 
same time.  Therefore, when we hear someone is a rapist, we might 
keep our distance.  However, distance provides no shelter on 
cyberspace.  On the contrary, distance is the perpetrator’s 
specialty.303  Distance is a disinhibiting, effective, and empathy-free 
criminal tool.304  This is a different and unique type of sexual danger, 
derived from deception, manipulation, or even coercion.305 
Indeed, pedophiles who approach children online often use fake 
personas and misrepresent themselves, through deception, 
manipulation, and sometimes blackmail.306  The verbal rape thesis 
suggests a normative difference from that of the physical forms of 
rape.307  Distant manipulation always requires a self-inflicted act of 
penetration.308 
Furthermore, geographical distance between perpetrators and 
victims means the absence of possible immediate physical escalation, 
a potential danger in fraudulent rape and sometimes in statutory rape 
when victims change their mind and cease cooperating.309  No 
wonder the verbal rape phenomenon is new even for pedophiles.310  
The possibilities of adults to reach children, lie to them about their 
age, meet them, win their trust and heart, and finally bring them to 
agree to sexual activity, are much more limited offline.311  Those who 
succeed in manipulation in the real world are not likely to forego full 
 
302.  See Castronova, supra note 125, at 1092–93 (stressing that although technology offers 
many sexual options, online fertilization is not amongst them). 
303 . See Mathis, supra note 266, at 186 (noting that sexual danger to children has moved 
from the parks to cyberspace). 
304.  See Suler, supra note 151, at 322 (noting that an online perpetrator is less inhibited 
because of the anonymity in contacting someone at a distance). 
305.  See infra text accompanying notes 306–14. 
306.  See Child Sexual Exploitation, FBI (May 10, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories 
/threat-from-pedophiles-online-is-vast-and-extensive [https://perma.cc/B6RA-9BRN] 
(“The pedophiles tricked their young victims by creating fake profiles on social 
networking sites, where they posed as teenagers to lure children to their websites.”). 
307.  See infra notes 309–14 and accompanying text. 
308.  See supra text accompanying notes 160–74. 
309.  See supra notes 238–56 and accompanying text. 
310.  See Mathis, supra note 266, at 186 (referring to the internet as a “new ‘modern public 
square’” that presents novel dangers to children). 
311.  See supra text accompanying notes 238–52. 
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intercourse.312  The dangers of verbal rape entail deception, 
manipulation, and coercion, all of which are far from being 
insignificant and marginal in nature.313  Nevertheless, they are 
usually dealt with under different legal frameworks.314  These 
frameworks may be general, outdated offenses.  Alternatively, they 
may be unique and new.  A general framework might be for non-
sexual offenses, like fraud and blackmail, or some sort of a sexual 
offense, if the language employed is broad and abstract enough.  
For example, the rape offense in New Jersey was replaced with a 
general offense of sexual assault in 1978, and the term of penetration 
was widened to include intercourse, anal sex, oral sex, as well as 
inserting fingers or objects into another’s vagina or rectum, either by 
the perpetrator or under the perpetrator’s instruction.315  This law was 
applied to a verbal rape scenario, regarding someone posing as a 
physician who brought a child to engage in self-penetration.316  
In California, the general provisions in the penal code include a 
scenario in which the perpetrator inserts something to the victim’s 
genitalia against their will.317  When the victim is under fourteen, 
there is no need to show force or threat.318  One who knowingly 
contacts a minor in order to perform such action is also criminally 
liable.319  These provisions were used to convict a sixty-year-old 
perpetrator who deceived a sixteen-year-old girl into online 
communication and later into self-touch.320  There is also a federal 
law which covers an interstate persuasion of minors to engage in 
 
312.  See Roth, supra note 259, at 1676 (explaining that adolescents are more susceptible to 
manipulation and ultimately believing it was their own decision to participate in 
sexual conduct). 
313.  Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 202–03 (stressing the severity of online sexual 
deception); see also Manta, supra note 250, at 247 (emphasizing the personal and 
collective harm of sexual fraud related to online dating). 
314.  See Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 
11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 60–61 (2008) (discussing the lack of a specific legal 
framework dealing with virtual crimes). 
315.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(c) (West 2020).  The word “rape” does not appear in 
New Jersey’s criminal code.  See id.; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(5)(b)(1)(a) 
(West 2019) (Wisconsin’s sexual assault statute is similar to New Jersey’s). 
316.  See New Jersey v. Maxwell, 825 A.2d 1224, 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001). 
317.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2020). 
318.  See id. § 289. 
319.  See id. § 288.3(a). 
320.  See People v. Shapiro, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54, 56–57 (2014) (denying constitutional 
challenge to California’s statute prohibiting contacting a minor for the purpose of 
committing various crimes, including sexual penetration of a minor, and approving 
sentence of 240 days’ imprisonment). 
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prostitution or sexual activity.321  It is not completely clear whether 
this law can be applied to online sexual activity.322  
Hitherto, no state has formally defined the scenarios thoroughly 
examined here as “rape.”323  There are some specific prohibitions that 
address such scenarios, at least regarding minors.324  Louisiana has 
criminalized “[i]ndecent behavior with juveniles,” including 
“[c]omputer-aided solicitation of a minor.”325  Idaho has created a 
specific offense of “[e]nticing a child through use of the Internet or 
other communication device.”326  Canada has a specific provision 
regarding minors, titled “Invitation to sexual touching,” which may 
apply to the above described scenarios.327  When the acts involve 
dissemination of photographs, they are subject to prohibitions under 
child pornography laws.328  Five American states passed laws to 
explicitly prohibit sextortion.329 
Such special offenses present new terminology, which tells a new 
story, helping us to differentiate them from the old traditional and 
general offenses.330  The labels of criminal offenses convey legal 
 
321.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2018). 
322.  Compare United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012), with United States 
v. Taylor, 640 F.3d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 2011). 
323.  See Susan W. Brenner, The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, in 
CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 207, 208 (Jack M. 
Balkin et al., eds., 2006) (arguing that although many types of acts are possible 
online, rape is not); see Brenner, supra note 314, at 77; see also Lemley and Volokh, 
supra note 125, at 1083 (applying the normative meaning of rape to virtual groping 
performed by avatars against other avatars, causing emotional distress to users of 
violated avatars). 
324.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1590A (West 2020).  See generally LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
14:81, 14:81.3 (2020). 
325.  See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:81, 14:81.3 (2020); see also Louisiana v. Whitmore, 58 So. 
3d 583, 585–87, 590–93, 595–97 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11) (denying constitutional 
challenge and affirming defendant’s four-year prison sentence for conversing online 
with an undercover police agent and attempting to induce a minor to self-touch). 
326.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1590A (West 2020); see also Idaho v. Glass, 190 P.3d 896, 
899900, 905 (Idaho 2008) (approving a fifteen-year sentence for defendant who 
conversed online with a police agent posing as a child). 
327 . See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 § 152 (Can.). 
328.  See Mills, supra note 273, at 9 (stressing the broadness of child pornography laws, 
which often include peer sexting between teenagers). 
329.  See Robbins, supra note 220, at 776, 781–84 (reviewing new legislation in Alabama, 
Arkansas, California, and Utah). 
330.  Clay Calvert et al., Playing Legislative Catch-Up in 2010 with a Growing, High-Tech 
Phenomenon: Evolving Statutory Approaches for Addressing Teen Sexting, 11 PITT. J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2010) (discussing the new phenomenon of sexting); see 
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messages to society about the sexual abuse of minors, online or in 
general.331  Simultaneously, the labels employed also send the 
message that although criminal law will not tolerate such conduct, 
the law still sees material differences between certain types of actions 
and forms of rape.332  This message might be supplemented by the 
law’s message that only minors can be the victims of such offenses, 
excluding adults as potential victims.  Adults can be the victims of 
rape, sexually coerced, and deceived online, but some states have not 
created special offenses to protect them in this new offensive 
world.333 
CONCLUSION 
A very familiar saying is that the law always lags behind 
technology.334  But it is not only technology that changes, as the law 
constantly evolves.335  When society and law enforcement run into 
new offensive scenarios, we get the chance to rethink our existing 
criminal offenses and societal values.  This is a great opportunity to 
reflect on important developments in technology and the law. 
What is rape?  Numerous academic research projects have been 
conducted on rape, perhaps more so than on any other offense; yet 
sometimes the more we study rape, the less we grasp its normative 
essence.336  The cyber rape thesis compels us to deeply reflect once 
again upon rape as a criminal offense, inspect its normative 
boundaries, and examine if it can take on a digital form.  Can rape be 
done from afar, through words?  One can be deceived, manipulated, 
and coerced into self-penetration from a distance.337  Should such 
illicit communication be considered rape?  The answer illuminates 
what rape was, what rape is, and what rape might become in the 
future. 
 
also Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 801–02 (1988) (describing how feminism manifested the 
acknowledgement of sexual harassment as a unique legal harm). 
331.  See supra notes 323–30 and accompanying text. 
332.  See supra text accompanying notes 323–30. 
333.  See supra notes 6–9, 324–31 and accompanying text. 
334. Reidenberg, supra note 17, at 586; see Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of 
Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 87, 97 (2001) 
(analyzing the problems that outdated laws cause with technological crimes). 
335.  See Robin Feldman, Historic Perspectives on Law & Science, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 
15–17 (2009) (observing that the law is constantly changing). 
336.  See, e.g., Conaghan, supra note 1, at 177 (concluding that “it is difficult to identify or 
defend an ‘essence’ of rape”). 
337.  See supra Sections II.B, II.C. 
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The new technological world encourages us to embark upon a new 
and unfamiliar journey.338  That journey, in turn, obligates us to 
sincerely ask ourselves how well we understand the rationales of 
criminal offenses, the boundaries between them, and the frontiers of 
the criminal realm, realizing how difficult those questions are.  Once 



































338.  See supra text accompanying notes 334–37. 
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